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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL AND EQUITABLE LIMITATIONS ON THE PowER
OF THE MAJORITY TO AMEND CHARTERS SO AS TO AXFFECT S A EHOLDERS' INTERESTS IN THE CoRPop.ATION-One of the most remark-

able changes in recent corporation legislation has been the increasing
latitude given to the majority of the shareholders of a corporation to
amend the articles of incorporation at any time after the company has
been organized.' Not only are modifications in the form of internal
management and in the nature of the corporate business thus made
possible, but drastic changes in the financial structure and in the distribution of the beneficial interests as between the shareholders 2 are
also permitted. What protection is afforded to a minority who object
to an alteration of its property rights? The answer to this question
has never been satisfactorily stated, and yet it is apparent that with
growing corporate activity, a clearer conception of the minority's
rights will be increasingly important.3
A recent amendment to the Delaware corporation law - in broad
language empowers the majority of the shareholders, on the recommendation of the board of directors, to vary the rights of shareholders
by "reclassifying . .. , changing the number, par value, designations,
preferences, or relative participating, optional or other special rights
of the shares, or the qualifications, limitations or restrictions of such
rights .
." The validity of a charter amendment made in pursuance of this authorization, by the majority shareholders of a corporation created before the passage of the act, has been examined
recently in the case of Davis v. Louiville Gas & Electric Co.5 In that
case, the proposed charter amendment made changes in the order of
dividend distribution for the benefit of one class of stock (Class A
common) and to the detriment of another class (Class B common),
and destroyed the privilege of the corporation to redeem the benefited
'See CoxMYiGTOx, CoPoRATror PRocuRE (2d. ed. 1927) 686. For a citation and classification of the statutory provisions permitting majority to
make charter amendments see Dcodd, Dissenting Stockholderr and Amendments
to CorporateCharters (1927) 75 U. op PA. L. REv. 585, at 745 n. 122, 123.
'For example, see the recent General Corporation Act of Ohio, 112 Ohio
Laws 9 (igz7) §8623-14, 8623-I5.
'The best analysis of the constitutionil problem is in Dodd, op. cit. s=pra
note L. On the equitable question, see BER.z, STUMES r LAw OF CoPoaA
FiNANCE (1928)

2-40.

*35 Del. Laws c. 8s § io (1927) amending DEL. REv. CODE (1915)

. 6

§ 26. Under c. 65 § 82 of DEL. Rsv. CODE (1915) there is a reservation of the

right to alter, amend, or repeal. Act of 1921 P. L. 1159 § 3, PA. STAT. (West,
Supp. x928) § 5655a-3 requires unanimous consent to change any of the terms.
rights or privileges of outstanding stock.
142 At!. 654 (Del. z928).
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class of stock.6 The avowed purpose of the alteration was to facilitate the obtaining of additional capital, by making the A stock more
attractive to investors, and issuing new shares of this class of stock.
The minority of the class adversely affected resisted the amendment
as unconstitutional and inequitable. The court refused to interfere.
The problem presented has two distinct phases: I. Can the
legislature constitutionally amend its corporation law so as to empower
the majority to make this charter amendment? II. Is there an equitable limitation on the use to which the majority may put this power,

which limitation invalidates the proposed amendment? 7
I. It is settled law that the operative facts, incorporation under

a general statute and filing of articles of incorporation, create as
to the association certain immunities from sovereign interference
under the Federal Constitution. The same result is achieved whether
the charter is conceived of as a contract 8 with the state, or whether the
contract theory is discarded and the charter be conceived of as "mere
evidence that the incorporators have complied with the legislative
SThe stock was originally divided into Class A common, which was
non-voting and redeemable by the corporation at any time at $32.50 per share,
and Class B common stock. The dividend distribution originally provided for
was as follows: Class A was first entitled to $i.5o per share; if there was any

surplus, Cass B was to receive i.5o per share; if any further surplus remained it was to go to Class A and B equally up to 50 cents a share; then
any further distribution was to be made to the two classes, share for share,
of one for Class A and four for Class B. The amendment would have each
class share alike after the original $I.5o has been paid to each, and would make
the A stock non-redeemable by the corporation.
'There is of course a preliminary question in each case as to whether,
under the construction of the particular statute, the necessary power has
been granted by the legislature to make the proposed amendment. Thus, it '
has been pointed out that where authority to amend is given to the majority
in general language by statute in force at time of incorporation, the scope of the
majority's power to amend is no greater than its power to accept amendments
offered by the legislature. Dodd, mtpra note i at 746, citing Wright v. Minn.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 193 U. S. 657, 24 Sup. Ct. 549 (1904); Polk v. Mutual
Reserve Fund Life Assn., 2o7 U. S. 310, 28 Sup. Ct. 65 (igo7).
The following cases involved statutory construction and not a constitutional
question. Peters v. U. S. Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 Atl. 598 (Ig92)
(amendment valid under statute existing at time of incorporation) ; Morris v.
Am. Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 12-- At. 696 (1923) (amendment
valid in part); Pronick v. Spirits Distributing Co., 58 N. 3. Eq. 97, 42 At!.
586 (x8gg) (amendment invalid); General Investment Co., v. American Hide
& Leather Co., 98 N. J.Eq. 326, 129 At. 244 (1925) (amendment valid);
Thomas v. Lacona Car Co., 251 Mass. 529, 146 N. E. 775 (Q925) (amendment
valid); Grausman v. Porto Rican-American Tobacco Co., 95 N. J.Eq. 155, 121
Atl. 895 (1923) (amendment valid).
The right given to a minority to compel the majority to purchase their
stock at an appraised value, may have an effect on the construction of such
statutes.
"The contract idea, first enunciated in the Dartmouth College Case, 4
Wheaton 518 (U. S. 18ig) the basic principles of which were anticipated
in Fletcher v. Pcck, 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. 18o6) ; Terret v. Taylor 9 Cranch
43 (U. S. 18T) has "become firmly established as a canon of American juris1brudence." Brown, J.in Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. 161 U. S. 646, 66o,
x6 Sup. Ct 705, 7o8 (1896). For a list of cases in accord, see 7 R. C. L. 94, n. 6.
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requirements" and hence are entitled to do business in a corporate
manner.9 The same operative facts create a large number of legal
relations between the associates who are the shareholders. When the

power is reserved by the state to repeal, alter or amend 1 0 it is clear

that some of the immunities of the association are destroyed, but that
there still remains some limitation on the power of the state to amend
the corporation laws.11
The effect of such a reservation of power by

the state on the immunity from impairment of the' relations of the
shareholders inter se is not clear.

Many authorities seem to proceed on the theory that the creation
of the relations as to shareholders inter se is a matter separate and
distinct from the creation of the relations between the corporation and
the state, and that therefore the state may not directly alter any of the
relations of the shareholders inter se.12 Other authorities would seem

to lend color to an opposed theory."3

According to the latter view,

all the terms of the agreement between shareholders, as to the manage-

ment of the corporation and as to their interest in the corporation,
are conditions upon which the state grants the privilege of corporate
existence.

The reserved power gives the state the absolute power to

withhold or alter this privilege.

It is concluded, that an incident of

9The discussion as to whether a charter is a legislative grant and whether
a grant is a contract, is beyond the scope of this note.
" Such a reservation can be made under general statute, constitution, or in
charter. See i Tnompsox, CopaoRaTONs (3d. ed. 927) §§ 430-432. In
England it has been held that a corporation cannot contract itself out of the
power conferred on it by statutes, of altering and amending its articles of
association. Walker v. London Tramways Co., 2 Ch. D. 7o5 (1879).
"Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 324 (r877). For analysis of cases, see
Stern, The Limitatiois of the Powuer of a State Under a Reserved Right
to Amnend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation (19o5) 53 U. OF PA. L. REV. i;
BAxALNTIrNE, CoRPonATsONS (1927) § 279.
'This is the thesis of Stern, op, cit. supra note ii: That all the reserved
power accomplishes or constitutionally can accomplish, is to restore the power
of the state to the plane which it would have occupied had the Supreme Court
held that corporate charters are not contracts-that is, to give the state control
in the nature of a supervisory power over the franchises, privileges and immunities which it had previously granted to the association. That the reserved power
was never intended, nor can it constitutionally enable the state, either directly
or by permission given to some of the corporators as against the others, to alter
the contract of association among the sociis even though that contract might be
formally expressed in the charter over which the power is reserved. Judge
Stem admitted that the cases did not support him. Later cases show even more
clearly that this view is not law today.
Berle, op. cit. supra note 3, at 3, indicates that a historical analysis, and the
continental theory of corporations support Judge Stern's view, but our present
accepted theory begets a different result.
The following cases invalidating amendments lend color to the view:
Dow v. Northern R. P_, 67 N. H. 1, 36 Atl. 5io (x886) ; Allen v. Francisco
Sugar Co., 92 N. 3. Eq: 431, 435, r:r2 Atl. 887, 889 (1921) ; Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. IL, 78 N. J. Eq. 178 (1867) ; Kean v. Johnson, 9 N. J.
Eq. 401 (1853) ; It re Newark Library Association, 64 N. J. L. 217, 43 Atl. 435

(1899) ; Kenosha, R. & R. I. Ry. Co. v. Marsh, 17 Wis. 13 (1863).
"

See Stern, op. cit. suPra note :x, at 87-89--paraphrasing 4 Tuourson',

CoRpPOATIoNs (ist ed. 1895) § 54-7.
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this absolute power is the right to demand that the state be given entire
control of all of the relations between shareholders, as a condition to
the obtaining of the corporate privilege, which demand the state makes
by reserving the power. No case carries this theory to its logical
conclusion.'- To do so would be to say that the power of the legislature to alter the rights of shareholders is without limitation, and to
permit this would be permitting the state to impose a condition on the
associates which under the Constitution of the United States it has no
right to impose, that is, the power to impair the obligation of contracts.
Although there is no consistent application of any principles in
the decided cases, an examination of the actual decisions warrants the
conclusion that the legislature has the power to alter directly some of
the relations of the shareholders,"L-a class of relations which we may
describe as the rights of the shareholders with regard to the management and control of the corporation. But the state can no more
impair the relations of the shareholders with regard to their beneficial
interests in the corporate property, that is, the shareholders' right to
share in dividend distribution and their right on dissolution to participate in the assets, than it could impair the same relations between
copartners. The idea has been expressed by Hatch, J., in Hinckley v.
Schwarzchild & Co., " as follows:
"These cases would seem to authorize the conclusion that
acts which do no more than regulate and control the internal management of a corporation, so far as it has relation to the public
and concerns the policy of the State, are within the power to alter
and repeal, even though the exercise of the power adds to the
burden of the stockholder by increasing his liability, or diminishes
the value of his stock, or changes the name, offices or proportion
in management and control of the corporation. Within this
power under this rule must necessarily fall the right to change the
capital stock of the corporation as to amount, kind and classification .. . "
To test the constitutionality of any legislation, therefore, which
alters the rights of the shareholders, it must be determined whether
the proposed change is included within the class "changes in internal
1All the cases which uphold amendments recognize that there are limits
to the extent that such amendments may affect the shareholders! interests.
See for example Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 194 N. Y. 212, 87
N. E. 443 (1909).
" See the great number of cases digested by Stern, op. cit. supra note uX,
at go-io8, to which should be added: Morris v. American Public Utilities Co.,
supra note 7 at i!5 (preferred shareholder may be denied a right to vote) ;
Hinckley v. Schwarzchild & Co., 95 N. Y. Supp. 357 (i9o5); Randle v.
Winona Coal Co., 206 Ala. 254, 89 So. 7-o (1921) ; Perkins v. Coffin, 84 Conn.
275, 79 AUt. o7o (igni); Somerville v. St. Louis Mining and Milling Co.,
46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464 (9I) ; Barth v. Pock, 5I Mont 418, 429, 155 Pac.
-282,284 (x9i5) ; Winfree v. Riverside, 1I3 Va. 717, 25 S.E. 309 (1912).
"Supra note 15, at 363. Cf. BERm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 28.

26o

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

management," that is in the technical and financial conduct of the
enterprise, or whether it falls in another category. If the legislation
falls-in the first class, then the only protection afforded the shareholder
is the requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment that it be not
arbitrary. On the other -hand if the change purports to affect the
agreement of the existing shareholders with regard to their respective
beneficial interests in the corporation property, then the protection of
the "impairment clause" of the Constitution as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment would invalidate the legislation.
The Davis case ignored any difference in these situations and
justified the amendment because of the public interest in the continued
existence of the corporate form.1 7 Such a holding is tantamount to
permitting the state to alter all the relations of the shareholders interse,
without limit, a result that is at variance with the decided cases. The
fact that the change was permitted by empowering the majority to act,
as distinguished from being compelled by a compulsory amendment,
does not alter this conclusion, for the power to offer amendments to
the majority is, like the power to impose amendments, subject to limitations."' These limitations are of the same general character in each
case, and it would seem clear that the majority should not be permitted
by a subsequent authorization to make amendments which the legislature could not have made directly."
The question before the court
therefore, was whether the legislature could directly legislate so as to
change the legal relatiohs as to the shareholders with regard to dividend distribution, in such a way as to allow one group of shareholders to get a greater share in the profits than was agreed and to
force another group to take less than was agreed.
No decided case has been found which permits such an amendment. One group of cases has permitted amendments in corporate
powers and purpose.20 The extent to which this may be done is not
2'In Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., supra note 5, at 657, the Chancel-

lor (Wolcott) said: "May it not be assumed that the Legislature foresaw
that the interests of the corporations created by it might, as experience
supplied the material for judgment, be best subserved by an alteration of
their intra-corporate and in a sense private powers, and in the interest of a
public policy which coveted their successful progress, have meant to reserve
to itself by the general amendment clause a right to alter or enlarge such
powers."
' Dodd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 724-729 says that the analysis of the
problem of empowering a majority to amend resolves itself into the problem as
to whether the reserved power enables the legislature to substitute for the
rule of unanimous consent its rule of majority control. There is a conflict
in the cases as to whether this may be done at all, but where it may be
done there are implied limitations. As to the authority for this statement, see
ibid. 729, n. 77. There can be no objection on the ground that this is a delegation of legislative power. Ibid. 728, n. 76.
2' Stern, op. cit. sirpra note ii, at 93.
It is generally said that the majority can accept only "non-fundamental"
changes in the charter. For cases permitting such changes, see Durfee v. Old
Colony & Fall River Ry. Co., 5 Alien 23o (Mass. 1862); Taggart v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 24 Md. 563 (r866); Spregg v. Western Tel. Co., 46 Md. 67
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clear, but in any event such cases are not authority for the Davis Case
for such amendments do not deal directly with shareholders' relations,
even though as a result thereof the shareholder is indirectly affected..
The cases which permit the legislature to make changes in voting
power and manner of voting 21 may be distinguished as cases of
"internal management" because of the state's interest in the method
of corporate control. The amendments in charters, held valid, which
make non-assessable stock assessable,12 or make shareholders personally liable for the corporate debts 23 may likewise be distinguished
from the Davis case because, in the former, of the state's interest in
the "internal management" of the corporation, and in the latter, of its
interest in the protection of creditors. In all these cases the interest
of each shareholder in the corporation was affected in exactly the same
way, so that each presents a different factual situation from the Davis
case.
There are a number of cases which permit the majority to amend
the charter so as to issue preferred stock, having preference over
the outstanding stock.2 ' The case relied on by the court in the Davis
(1876); Buffalo & N. Y. City Ry. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336 (x8s6);
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 22 Mo. 291 (1855); Gray v. Monongahela Nay.
Co., 2 W. & S. I56 (Pa. 1840; see note (I912c) ANN. CAS. 12o3 n. Cowtra:

Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. R., supra note 12.
mLooker v. Maynard, I79 U. S. 46, 2z Sup. Ct 21 (igoo); Gregg v.
Granby Mining & Smelting Co., 164 Mo. 616, 65 S. W. 312 (igoI); Hyatt
v. Esmond, 37 Barb. 6oi (N. Y. I82); Cross v. W. Va. Cent & P. H. Ry.,
35 W. Va. z74, 12 S. E. io7I (i891); cf. Lord v. Eqhitable Life Assurance
Soc., supra note 14. See note: Right uder reserved power to amend or repeal charter of corporation to change the rights of stockholders as to voting
the stock (IMo0) 22 L. R. A. (N. s.) 42o.
Under the Delaware statute, the abrogation of the preemptive right by
the majority would be sustained in a proper corporate situation. See Morris
v. American Public Utility Co., supra note 7, at 155 ". . . the right to vote
is not such a change in property rights as to be exempt from the tampering
effect of amendment where general power to amend is reserved. It is but an
alteration which concerns the internal management of the corporation . .
This result would follow if the preemptive right only attaches to voting stock.
RESTAT MENT oF LAw oF Businnss AssocrAmox;-Tentative Draft No. z.
-(Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 12. A court of equity would in general prevent such
abrogation where the intention is to dilute the shareholders aliquot interest in
the surplus by creating new shares without such rights.
'Gardner v. Hope Ins. Co., 9 R1. 194 (1869); Somerville v. St Louis
Mining & Milling Co., supra note 15. Contra: Enterprise Ditch Co. v. Moffit,
58 Neb. 642, 79 N. W. 56o (1899); Garey v. St Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah

497, 91 Pac. 369 (igoT) ; note (i9o7) 7 Cor. L. REv. 598.

"'The exercise of this power of the legislature in such a case is held to
be only a repeal of part of the corporate franchise" Williams v. NaIl, io8
Ky. 21, 30, 55 S. W. 7o6, 7o8 (zgoo). Accord: Sherman v. Smith, i Black
587 (U. S. 1862) ; McGowan v. McDonald, iii Cal. 57, 43 Ra. 418 (1896) ;
South Bay Meadow Dam Co. v. Gray 30 Me. 547 (1849); Bissel v. Heath,
98 Mich. 472, 57 N. W. 585 (1894); Anderson v. Seylnore, 70 Minn. 358, 73
N. W. 171 (1897); see Perkins v. Coffin, 84 Conn. 275, 79 Adt. io7o (i9xi).
"Hinckley v. Schwarzchild & Co., supra note 15; Randle v. Winona Coal
'Co., su~ra note 15; Curry v. Scott, 54 Pa. 270, 277 (1867); West Chester &
P. R. R. v. Jackson, 77 Pa. 32r (1875) (constitutional point was not argued) ;
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case, Hinckley v. Schwarzchild & Co., 25 was such a case. In that instance, the corporation as originally formed issued only common stock.
Thereafter the legislature authorized the issuance of preferred stock
on the recommendation of two-thirds of the shareholders-which
issuance under the law at the time of incorporation required unanimous
consent of the shareholders. The legislation was held to be within
the reserved power to alter and amend. This case, and others like it,
are readily distinguishable from the Davis case. New capital is being
induced into the enterprise and the terms under which it comes, is
largely a matter of internal management. The quid pro quo for the
new capital is a limited preference in profit sharing each year and a
preferential claim against the assets on distribution, which claim is
limited to the amount contributed. Certainly the practical effect on
the shareholders is much the same as an issue of mortgage bonds. It
is significant that there was only one class of shareholders at the time
of the amendment, every member of which class was affected in
exactly the same way. It is demonstrable that the issuance of a new
class of stock, where there are already two or more classes of shareholders, may benefit one class more than another, and such issuance
may be valid.2
But it is an anomalous situation where the fact that
the corporation requires new capital may be used as a license for the
majority to increase the rights of one existing class of shareholders,
and correspondingly decrease the rights of another existing class,
without creating any new class of stock.
36 (1863) (such issuance is not
a defense to liability on a. subscription contract). See also County Judge of
Shelby County v. Shelby R. R., 5 Bush 225 (Ky. 1865), discussed by Stern,
op. cit. sapra note ii at 99. Cf. Morris v. American Pub. Utilities Co., sipra
note 7 (an amendment by which preferred stock was made junior to two
new classes of preferred stock was upheld. The power of the legislature
to authorize this under the reserved power was not argued or considered). But
see Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. '59 (1879); cf. Schilling v. Car
Lighting & Power Co., 289 Fed. 489 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1922), aff'd, 289 Fed.
Rutland & Burlington R. I. v. Thrall, 35 Vt

493 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
It is submitted that if the shareholders expressly contract that no prior
preferred shares shall be issued, no legislative amendment could impair this
contract. See note (1925) 11 CoRN. L. QuAnRT. 78.
-Snpra note 15.
I This situation is suggested by Dodd, op. cit. supra note i at 731 n. 83:
"Thus, if a corporation which has preferred and common stock, issues second preferred stock, the effect on the holders of what thereby now becomes
first preferred stock is clear gain, -in that the assets are increased without affecting their preference, while the effect on the common stockholders is less
beneficent. Such an issue may, however, be a reasonable method of obtain-

ing additional capital and not mere wanton discrimination. It would seem
probable that many courts would construe the reserved power as authorizing
the enactment of a law permitting the majority to issue such new class of
stock." Even though the writer doubts that such new issue of stock could be
authorized without violating the Fourteenth Amendment if it harmed the
common shareholders, there is a difference between the issuing of new stock,
and changing the rights of the existing stock issued and unissued, that distinguishes this supposed case from the Davis case.

NOTES

The court in the Davis case did not dearly visualize the difference
between an amendment which, in more freely attaining the corporate
objects, had an effect on all the shareholders as a body, and an amendment that permitted a majority of the shareholders to change at wili
the property interests of various participants in the corporate enterprise. This distinction is basic, and therefore it would seem that the
decision in that case on the constitutional point involved is incorrect. 7"
II. The second phase of the problem is the one that is likely to
occasion great trouble in the courts, in future corporation litigation.
Let it be assumed, either that the power can be bestowed constitutionally on the majority by amendment as decided by the court in the
Davis case, or is given to the majority originally in the articles, in
which case there could be no question of the constitutional validity of
the power.28 The inquiry still must be made whether there is any
duty imposed on the majority by equity to so employ the power as to
preserve the interest of the minority in the corporation. As every
new corporate device comes into use, there comes into play the general
power of a court of equity to prevent unconscionable use of the powers
thereby created and to lay bare the controlling realities.29 The power
to amend, though given on its face absolutely, is subject to control by
a court of equity.
When there is but one class of stock, the beneficial rights of the
shareholder are principally the right to vote, the right to capital distribution on a teduction of capital or the winding up of the corporation, and the right to dividend payments. By dividing the shares into
classes, any or all of these beneficial rights may be varied, increased
or diminished, as to one group of members as distinguished from
another group. The purpose in granting power to the majority to
make changes in these rights after the shares are created, is to prevent
a dissentient minority from holding back a corporation where unanticipated changes in business conditions require either a change in the
The writer believes that the secondary argument of the court in support of the validity of the amendment is wholly without weight, namely, that

in the original certificate, the corparators agreed that the corporation should
have power to alter miany manner "now or hereafter prescribed by statute."
It is highly questionable whether such agreement prevents any of the rights
of the shareholders from vesting -which would vest in absence of such agreement, or that it gives any greater legislative freedom. Cf. Dodd, op. cit. smpra

note I, at 603, 11.5o. Especially is this to be doubted where the legislature
requires such a clause to be inserted in every charter.
"6 FLacirm, CycrorzDrA OF Trn LAW Or PsIvATz

CoaPoRAroNs (1919)

§ 4001, and cases cited.
' This is the thesis of Mr. Berle in a learned series of articles, in
which he studies in detail the equitable control over power of management,
in various factual situations. See Berle, Non Voting Stock and "Bakers'
Control," (1926) 39 H[ARV. L. REv. 673; Problems of NMo-par Stock, (1925)

25 Cor. L. REV. 43; Non-Ciamdatfve Preferred Stock, (1923) 23 Cor.. L.
REV. 358; ParticipatingPreferred Stock, (1926) 26 Cot.. L. REv. 303. These
.articles are all collected in his new volume, BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF.
CoRoRATIoN FINANcE (1928).
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purposes of a corporation or a change in the financial structure.30

It

is not contemplated that under this power to amend, a majority may
sweep away arbitrarily all or any important part of the beneficial interests of any single shareholder.
As before indicated, where stock is divided into two or more
classes, it is not possible to create new shares and maintain each shareholder's proportional total interest in the corporation.2
The pre-

emptive right given to voting shareholders, is an attempt on the part
of equity to protect the shareholders' control when new stock is

created.

2

So also equity will protect the shareholders' interest in the

net assets of a corporation by controlling the price at which new shares
of non-par stock are created, even though authority to fix the price be
given to the directors, or to the majority acting formally. 3
These
are manifestations in various situations of attempts 'on the part of a
court of equity, under its general power, to protect the shareholder's
intra-corporate financial interest. Like the issuance of new stock, any
charter change which deals with tle rights of the various classes of
shareholders must change the proportional interest of each class of

shareholder in the corporation.

The statute permits this, just as a

statute authorizes the issue of new stock, but the protection offered by
equity in such a case is a demand that the change inaugurated be bona
fide for the benefit of the corporation, that is, a change that will enable
the group enterprise to function more efficiently in the realization of a
central ambition to be found in the terms of the original articles. The
power to amend does permit changes in the proportional interest of
the associates, but such changes must not be motivated by a desire to
benefit some one group of the associates. The result is that there is
I Under the classical rule of Natusch v. Irving, Gow, PARTNxESHips (3d
ed. 1841) 398, changes in the corporation purpose required unanimous consent. However this rule is not satisfactory today, and inevitable changes in
business conditions require the greatest freedom in the amendment of corporate charters that is compatible with safety to the security holders.
"Unless of course, new shares of each class of outstanding stock are
created, and each class is given pre-emptive rights in the corresponding newly
created class.
TGray
v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 363 (18o7) (leading case). For
analysis of the preemptive right, see the COsmmENTARmzs oN BusrNmss AssoCATiONs-Tentathe Draft No. .- (Am. L. Inst. 1928) p. 17 et seq., containing
a list of all the cases. A reference to some of the literature is contained in
BAUANTIN,

CoRpoRATioNs (1927) 420 n. 33.

'Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp.-Del. Ch.-, 132 Atl. 442, 447
(1926). "Notwithstanding, therefore, the absolute terms in which the power of
the directors of this corporation to fix the price at which its unissued stock may,
be sold is expressed, equity will, nevertheless, by analogy to the reasoning which
underlies the doctrine of preemptive right, interfere to protect existing stockholders from an unjustified impairment of the values underlying their present
holdings, where it is proposed by the directors to fix the consideration for
the new shares of the no par value type'
See also Atlantic Refining Co. v.
Hodgman, 13 Fed. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 3d 1926) reversing 3oo Fed. q9o (D. C.
Del. 1924). WICiKERSHAM, STOCK WITrOUT PAR VALUE, (1927) 86 et seq.;
Bonbright, Danger of Shares Without Par V;alue (I924) 24 COL L. REv.
449; Berle, op. cit. supra n. 29, 25 CoL. L. Ray. 43.
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imposed on the majority who have the power to amend, some duty to
protect the minority. It is arguable whether this duty is that of a
fiduciary,34 but at any rate the majority nzus show some justification
in the form of a greater prospective advantage to the corporation as
an entity, which will compensate the minority for their loss of interest.3 It is impossible to lay down any general rule as to when a
minority may object to such an amendment. Whether sufficient corporate justification is shown depends on the circumstances of each
particular case.
The comparative recency of statutes permitting changes in the
intra-corporate structure precludes the existence of any body of
decided cases, showing equitable limitations on the power. Many of
the cases in deciding the constitutionality of proposed amendments are
guided by equitable principles. Where power is given to a majority
to create and amend by-laws, it has long been held that such power
must not be used oppressively. 8 So likewise where the majority are
given liberal powers with regard to dissolution, merger, consolidation,
or sale of corporate assets, there are equitable limitations 7 But none
of these cases involved a change in the property rights among the
associates alone.
In England, where amendments in the articles for a long time
have by statutory authorization been made by the majority of the
shareholders, there are clear holdings that any intended changes in the
members' rights vested by the creation of shares, requires a justification on the grounds of corporate purpose. s
"' On duty with regard to management of business, see Fletcher, op. cit.
supra note 28, § 3973; note (igog) 2z HARv. L. Ry. 59; Wood, The Statis of

Management Stockholders (1928) 38 YAim L. J. 57. Bmta., op. cit. .supra

note 3 p. 5i, suggests that the basis of the equitable power is the analogy to its
ancient power over uses and trusts---i. e. control by one group of persons over
property rights beneficially vested in another.
I Cf. PAL,im, Co.ePAxY LAiv (i2th ed. 1924) 50 n: "It is submitted that

it is difficult to accept as the test of validity 'the benefit of the company;' for
it may be said the company is composed of its members, and -a benefit of a
majority is a benefit to the company as a whole. The true view would appear to be that the benefit must be a benefit to the company as a trading
entity irrespective of who are the shareholders. . . .
' BALLANT NE, op. cit. mtpra note 32, § 179.

'See Fain, Linitations on the Statutory Power of Mqjority Stockholders
to Dissolve a Corporation (1912) z5 HRv.L. Rnv. 676.
' The articles of incorporation in England are subordinate to the memo-

randum, which is the constitution of the company, but rights and preferences

of shareholders are usually contained in the articles. Under the Companies

Act of i9o8, 8 EDW. VII, c. 69 § 13, articles are amended by resolution of
the majority of shareholders. The only limitation on this power aside from -hat
arising out of construction of the statute is an equitable limitation-the courts

require a justification where any shareholder's interest is altered. See An-

drews v. Gas Co., [1897] 1 Ch. 361 (permitting issuance of preference shares) ;
Brown v. British Abrasive Wheel Co., [i919] i Ch. 29o (alteration requiring minority to sell their interest to majority held invalid) ; Shuttleworth v.
-Cox Bros. & Co. [1927] : K. B. 9 (alteration requiring resignation of director 'held valid); Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa [1oo] : Ch. 656 (lien
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The court in the Davis case indulged the presumption that the
action of the majority was bona fide. There was no requirement of
a showing that the destruction of the rights of Class B shareholders

was necessary to the continued prosperity of the corporation, of to
raise increased capital. It is submitted that a presumption of bona
fides is insufficient; in the face of an altered charter right of the shareholders, the majority should have been required to show a corporate
justification. It is a rule of practical value that discretion in conducting the corporate business will not be interfered with, unless there is a
showing of overreaching. But where the power exercised has for its
effect the changing of the property interests of the associates in the
enterprise, a reliance on the inviolability of which brings the corporation into existence, no reason for the rule exists3 9
It would therefore seem that a full consideration of the new and
extensive kinds of intra-corporate change which the receirt statutory
or charter provisions permit to the majority of the shareholders, leads
to the conclusion that the doctrine of the Davis case should be sharply
limited.
rJ.R. Cades.
Philadelphia,Pa.
RIG11TS AND PRIORITIES OF AsSIGNEES OF SEVERAL
SECURED BY A SINGLE MORTGAGE-When promissory notes,

NOTES

secured

by one mortgage and maturing at different dates, are assigned by the
mortgagee to several assignees, there seems to be a wide divergence of

opinion on the subject of priorities. The question arises where no
stipulations as to priorities are to be found in either the mortgage or
the notes and when, upon default in payment and foreclosure, the
proceeds from the sale of the land are insufficient to pay all the notes
in full. In the recent case of Conway v. Yadon,' the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma held that the assignees should share the proceeds of the
sale pro rata without regard to the order of assignment or maturity of
the notes.
The "pro rata rule," applied in the principal case, would seem to
imposed on fully paid shares held valid). No case involving alteration of
present shareholders' right as to participation in profits or in capital distribution has been found.
'In Mr. Berle's new book, op. cit. sufpra note 3. the same point is made
in Introduction p. v: "To facilitate corporate business, courts have worked
out the doctrine that the management should have wide discretion in conducting the business affairs of the corporation, and indulged a. heavy presumption
in favor of action taken under this discretion. This was fair enough; courts
are not in a position to assume large responsibilities in the conduct of business. But with increasing flexibility of corporate charters and authorizing
statutes, managements sought and secured a new power. This was power
not to run the business of the corporation as a whole, but to determine and
adjiutdcate the property rights as betwee) the participants in the corporate.
entity. The distinction between these two varieties of power is only just
attaining recognition. But it is fundamental."
'269 Pac. 309 (Okla. 1928).
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be the view favored by the majority of American: jurisdictions 2
wherever express stipulations or special equities between the parties
are absent. The reasons for this rule are well stated in,
Wilson v.
Rigenzbrodt:3 "We adopt this rule as being not only the more equitable
but also as sound in principle, because in accordance with the implied
intentions of the parties as inferable from the nature of the contract.
The mortgage is as much security for one note as another,

.

.

.

for

the mortgage is one; and the mortgage being a mere incident to the
debt, an assignment of a part of a debt carries with it a pro rataproportion of the security. The different holders of the mortgage debt,
therefore, stand aquali jure, and consequently are entitled to participate pari passa in the fund derived from the security." Since the
parties to the contract are at liberty to stipulate any priorities which
they may desire, and effect will always be given to such stipulations,"
it would seem logical to declare that when no priorities are provided
for, none are in fact intended. It is highly improbable that the mortgagor should have any interest in priorities of payment, and it is
generally against the interest of the mortgagee to have the earlier
maturing notes preferred, since such priorities make -it doubly difficult
for him to dispose of the later maturing notes. The "pro rata rule"
rests on the implied intention of the parties that one mortgage shall
ratably secure each note.
In other jurisdictions, the so-called "prior maturity rule" is
applied, which gives a preference to the notes of the various assignees
in the order in which they mature.' The basis of the rule seems to be
that an assignment of each note is an assignment pro tanto of a corresponding portion of the mortgage and that on the maturing of each
note, its holder may foreclose the mortgage without waiting for the
other notes to mature.0 The result of this reasoning is the turning of
a single mortgage which was intended to secure a series of notes into
a series of mortgages each securing a single note.7 The rule has the
'Penzel v. Brookmire, 51 Ark. 1o5, 1o S. W. 15 (1888) ; Redman v. Furrington, 65 Cal. 27r, 3 Pac. 883 (884); Hall v. McCormick, 31 Minn. 2o,
17 N. W. 62o (883) ; Wooten v. Buchanan, 49 Miss. 386 (1873) ; Studebaker
Co. v. McCargur, 2o Neb. 5oo, 30 N. W. 686 (1896); Bank v. Moore, ixa

N. Y. 543, 2o N. E. 357 (1889); Kitchen v. Grandy, io N. C. 86, 7 S. E.
663 (i888) ; Donley v. Hays, 17 S. & R. 400 (Pa. 1828) ; Gordon v. Hazzard,
32 S. C. 351, IX S. E. 100 (1889); Bartlett v. Wade, 66 Vt.629, 3o AtI. 4
(1894) ; Bank v. Andrews, 7 Wash. 261, 34 Pac. 913 (1893).

130 Min. 4,

13

N. W. 907 (1882).

'Chew v. Buchanan, 30 Md. 367 (1868); Preston v. Morsman, 75 Neb.

358, io6 N. IV. 32o (9o5); Jackson's Appeal, 103 Pa. 255 (1883); Trust Co.
v. Smythe, 94 Tenn. 513, 29 S. W. 903 (i895).
5Horn v. Bennett, 135 Ind. i58, 34 N. E. 32r (1893); Schultz v. Bank,
141 Ill.
ii6, 3o N. E.346 (1892) ; Isett v. Lucas, 17 Iowa 5o3 (1864) ; Owings
v. MacKenzie, 133 Mo. 323, 33 S. W. 802, (1896); Bank v. Bank, 9 Wis.
57 (1859).
'School Fund v. Mitchell, 223 II. App. 8 (1g92).
'3 JoNEs, MoRTGAGEs (8th ed. x928) §2187; 3 Pommoy, Egurr JuisPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1201.
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effect of making the date of the lien depend not upon the date of the
issuing of the mortgage, in which case all the liens would be equal, but
upon the date of the maturity of the note. Priority is given to the
holder whose right of action accrues first, and strict adherence to
priority of lien in accordance with the law of mortgages is abandoned.
As is the case under the other rules, the priorities may be changed by
the expressed intentions or agreements of the parties,8 but parol evidence is inadmissible to alter the terms of the mortgage in this
respect.' A provision to the effect that all the notes will mature on
default in payment of principal or interest of any one, does not affect
the priorities as they existed when the notes were dated, even though
the contingency occurs and all the notes actually mature on the same
date.10 Where the notes are originally payable to different payees, the
courts adopting this rule do not give a priority to the payee whose note
first matures but distribute the fund pro rata."" The explanation for
this apparent inconsistency, as given by the courts, is that in such a
case it is as though two separate mortgages were executed simultaneously and no priority was intended. The difficulty with the whole
"prior maturity rule" is to find, in a mortgage that does not provide
for priorities, anything to indicate an intention that priorities none the
less shall be given. To infer such intention merely from the dates of
the notes would seem to be unwarranted.
There is a third view, followed in comparatively few jurisdictions, 32 known as the "prior assignment rule," which also gives priorities, but bases them on priority of assignment without regard to the
time of maturity of the notes. Here again it is said that an assignment of the note is an assignment pro tanto of the mortgage, and the
act of assignment divides the mortgage and converts the lien in effect
into a first and second, or third mortgage according to the number of
assignments. This rule seems to be derived from a principle, followed
by the majority of courts regardless of their view as to priorities
between assignees, that as between the mortgagee and his assignee,
where the former retains some of the notes, the assignee is to be preferred3' The reason for this exceptional treatment of the situation,
where the mortgagee retains some of the notes, will be considered in
the next paragraph. Accepting this latter principle as a premise, the
courts adopting the "prior assignment" rule reason that, upon a second
assignment, since the assignee gets no greater rights than his assignor,
8

School Fund v. Mitchell, mupra note 6; Corbin v. Kincaid, 33 Kan.
649, 7 Pac. 145 (188-).
0 Schultz v. Bank, suprd note 5; Isett v. Lucas, supra note 5.
' Horn. v. Bennett, supra note 5; Leavitt v. Reynolds, 79 Iowa 348, 44
N. W. 567 (1890). Contra: Pierce v. Shaw, 51 Wis. 316, 8 N. NV. 2o9 (188i).
"Shaw v. Newsom, 28 Ind. 335 (i88i); Coons v. Clifford, S8 Ohio St.
480, si N. E. 39 (i8 ).
'Nelson v. Dunn, 15 Ala. .oi (1849); see Parsons v. Martin, 86 Ala.
352, 5 So. 467 (x888) ; Gordon v. Fitzhugh, 27 Gratt. 835 (Va. 1876); Bank v.
Coke Co., 89 W. Va. 659, x.g S. E. Sg2 (i921).
13 PowERoy, loc. cit. upra-note 7.
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the second assignee must take the remaining notes subject to the priorities already created in favor of the first assignee,,, This view seems
objectionable in that it has the same effect of splitting up the mortgage
and results in the same inequalities of-distribution as are found in the
cases under the "prior maturity rule," and the result obtained does not
seem to be any more in accordance with the actual intentions of the
parties1 5 Furthermore, it would seem to be based upon a misapprehension as to the true reason for the preference which an assignee is
given over his own assignor"
As pointed out above, a majority of the courts prefer the assignee
over his assignor, and upon the theory that the assignee has a greater
equity by virtue of the assignment itself.u7 Some declare that in no case
is the assignee to be preferred. 8 In others the priority is given only
where the assignor is liable on his contract of indorsement in the note
to his assignee of the mortgage, 9 or where he has guaranteed payment,10 or has in some way estopped himself from setting up a right
to share in the proceeds pro rata. 2 Under this latter view the priority is given not because of superior equities but merely to avoid circuity of action.2 2 If the assignor shares pro rata and the assignee is
not paid in full, the latter of course may recover the deficit on his note
in another action, and the parties in the end would occupy the same
position as though the assignee had been given a priority in the first
place. If this is the real reason for the preference, its application
would not rest upon a rule of substantive law, and the statement that
the assignee has a greater equity would seem to be inexact and misleading. For example, if a mortgagee should assign one of the notes
and indorse it without recourse, he would not be liable on his contract
of indorsement and no guaranty of payment could be implied from the
assignment. His assignee takes the note at his own risk, in the same
manner that the assignor took it from the mortgagor. The fact that
the assignee has given his assignor value for the note is balanced by
the fact that the latter has also given value for it in his loan to the
mortgagor. The notes retained by the mortgagee are in all respects
ISee dissenting opinion of Gibson C. J. in Donley v. Hays, supre note 2,
at 405.
' See

Penzel v. Brookmire, smpr note a, at no.
'Note (1913) 42 L. R. A. (x. s.) 183, i87, 188.

' Realty Co. v. Bank, xg Ga. App. 2ig, 91 S. E. 267 (1916); Kuppenheimer v. Trust Co., 163 IRl. App. =z7 (911); Parkhurst v. Engine Co., 1o7
Ind. 594, 8 N. E. 635 (1886) ; Preston v. Morsman, spra note 4; Lawson v.
Warren, 34 OkIa. 94, 124 Pac. 46 (1912).
'Hinds v. Mooers, ii Iowa 211 (186); Jennings v. Moore, 83 Mich. 231,
47 N. W.

127

'Dixon

St 26o,

(189o).

v. Clayville, 44 Md. 573 (z876); Anderson v. Sharp, 44 Ohio

6 N. E. go (1886).

" Cannon v. McDaniel, 46 Tex. 3o3 (1876).
'Bareys Assigned Estate, 268 Pa. 370, i1 At!. 113 (19w0).
'Leonard v. Brooks, x58 La. I032, 105 So. 54 (1925); Donley v. Hays
mipra note 2.
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of the same general nature as those held by the assignee.

Therefore,

when the assignor has incurred no contingent liability by the assignment, he and his assignee are in similar positions, and as it would
seem that each note was intended to be ratably secured by the mortgage, there is no reason to prefer the assignee simply because the note

has been passed on to him by the assignor.23 The theory which gives
the assignee a greater equity by virtue of the assignment alone would
prefer the assignee even in this case. 24 To give another illustration,
when a mortgagee assigns one of the notes, even with an unqualified
indorsement, and later is insolvent at the time of distribution, logically
the assignee should come in against the assignor with the other creditors, for the balance remaining unpaid on his note after a pro rata
division of the proceeds of the land. 5 However, if he is said to have
a greater equity in the mortgaged premises, of course he is entitled to
be paid in full out of the proceeds before the assignee for the benefit
of creditors, whose rights are no greater than those of the bankrupt,
is entitled to anything.2 6 If this greater equity theory is correct, the
"prior assignment rule" would also seem to be correct. If the first
assignee has a greater equity, he gets it the minute the assignment is
made, and the subsequent assignees of the remaining notes having no
greater rights than their assignor, would themselves be subject to the
priority which the first assignee had obtained. If, on the other hand,
the priority is viewed simply- as a method of avoiding circuity of
action, the "prior assignment rule" will be seen to have no valid foundation.
The principal case seems, therefore, to be correct in adopting the
"pro rata rule," since it is sound in principle, easy to apply, and
equitable to all the parties. The views that prior maturity or prior

assignment should determine priority of lien are neither logical nor
equitable. The "pro rata rule" refrains from idle speculation as to
intentions of the parties, which if really existing have not been
expressed, cannot reasonably be implied, and ought, therefore, to have
no legal effect.
T.V.
,'InDonley v. Hays, supra. note 2 at 404, Tod, J. said: "There appears no
fact nor principle to exclude Walton [the mortgagee]. There is no. warranty
in his transfer express or implied. So far from there being any assignment
by him of his whole right in the mortgage, there is no assignment of any part
of it except what is implied by the transfer of the bonds. If Walton has
imparted no preference to others, he certainly must be considered as retaining
his right of equality. All this I believe to have been intended by the parties
at the time of the transfers. If they meant otherwise I am only sorry that
they did not express their meaning as it was very competent and easy for
them to do. We must adhere to the rule which, unless there is some agreement to the contrary, in cases of this kind throws the loss in equal shares upon
all the owners.'
" Abney v. Walmsley, 33 La. Ann. 599 (i88I).
'In re Preston, 7 N. Y. Supp. 92 (i889).
Fourth National Bank's Appeal, r23 Pa. 473, 16 Atl. 779 (1889).
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LIMITs oF PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY ON CONTRACTS MADE BY

His

AGENT-The recent English case of Reckitt v. Barnett ' raises some

interesting problems as to the limits of a principal's liability on contracts made by his agent. The principal gave his agent a broad power
of attorney covering the management of all his affairs, which power
did not in terms, however, authorize the drawing of checks. Upon
inquiry by the principal's bank, the principal notified it by letter that
his agent had authority "to draw checks without restriction." The
agent drew a check to the defendant's order signed "principal by
agent," in payment of the agent's personal debt to the defendant. All
of the signature, except the name of the agent, was faintly impressed
with a rubber stamp, so that the defendant did not notice it. However, he was of course charged with notice of the entire signature.
The defendant, who never saw either the power of attorney or the
letter, and who was a stranger to the principal, collected this check
from the principal's bank. The principal sued the defendant 2 for
conversion or for money had and received to his use. The Court of
Appeals held, two judges to one, that he could not recover.
The majority of the court proceeded on the assumption that the
agent's authority was to be determined by construing together the
power of attorney plus the letter to the bank.3 They recognized that,
as between the principal and agent, the act was unauthorized, being a
fraud on the former. However, the rule was applied that whenever
a third person, comparing the act done with the terms of the power,
finds that act within those very terms, the principal is bound, regardless of the agent's motive. The next step was to construe the power
plus the letter, and to find that the drawing of this check would appear
to be within the terms thereof. Finding that, they then concluded
that the defendant, although he did not examine the authority, was no
worse off than he would have been if he had-examined it, and therefore the principal was not allowed to recover. The dissent rested on
a contrary construction of the power and letter, deciding that an
examination of the documents would have revealed the agent's
inability to draw this particular check.4
1 [1928] 2 K. B. 244.

'It was agreed by both court and counsel that the drawee bank was
fully protected, in its action of paying out funds on the check, by the letter
of instructions sent it by the principal.
I The dissenting judge argued that the letter to the bank should not be
considered as a part of the agent's written authority, since it was directed
primarily to the bank and remained in its possession, not available for inspection of third parties, except by its courtesy. However in the major portion of
his opinion, he admits this point for purposes of argument, and proceeds to
differ'Itfrom
the rest of the court, even making this assumption.
is not the purpose of this note to pursue further the question of the
construction of the authority. Rather, the thesis of what follows is an examination of the underlying principle, apparently adopted by the entire court, that if
the act would appear to be within the terms of the power of attorney, even
though the third person never looked at the authority, the agent has power to
bind his principal.
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Before proceeding further with an examination of the underlying
principles of this case, it will be well to define a few terms. Real
authority, in its most widely accepted sense, refers to the agent's
power to do a class of acts which the principal consented to his doing.5
Apparent authority, as the term is generally used, is applied to the
agent's power to do a class of acts, by virtue of the principal's representations, the third person's reliance thereon, and the resultant
estoppel of the principal to deny his consent.0 The principal case
binds a man to a contract made by his agent, to which he did not
consent, and where there was no representation or reliance, that is,
where the agent had neither real nor apparent authority, as ordinarily
conceived. That there are many situations beyond those limits in
which a principal has been held, is not to be denied. These cases
have given rise to various theories, one of which is the "peculiar
knowledge doctrine" of New York," which does not, however, explain the instant case, for in it there was no fact peculiarly within
the agent's knowledge on which his authority depended, since the
principal could easily have decided the validity of the act in question, upon inquiry by the third person. Nor can the principle in the
famous case of Wateau v. Fenwick r be found to cover this situation,
for the most complete betrayal possible of the principal's interests
could hardly be said to rest within an agent's "incidental powers."
The case of Hatch v. Taylor,$ where a special agent violated certain
instructions, falls short of application as well. There the agent departed from his authority merely as to the manner of executing it.
The principal case, however, presents a different situation. The rule
laid down for determining the principal's liability in the Reckitt case
is expressed by Sankey, L. J., 1 as follows:
"If the agent in the course of his employment on behalf of
the principal, had apparent authority to draw the check in question, the principal is liable thereon to a person who takes it for
value, in good faith, and without notice that the agent has exceeded his authority. . . . Apparent authority means that the
agent apparently acted within the scope of his authority, and is to
'Seavey, The Rationale of Agency (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 859, 872-3; i
AGENCy (2d ed. 1914) § 712; HUFFCuT, AGENCy (2d ed. i9mO) § ioi;
but cf. Wright, Opposition of Law to Business Usages (i926) 26 Co. L. RFv.
920 et seq.
* Seavey, op. cit. supra note 5, at 873-4; MEccEM, op. cit. supra note 5 § 72o;
HIuFFCUT, op. cit. sepra note 5 § w03; but cf. Wright, op. cit. supra note 5, at 921.
""If an agent has power to do an act dependent on the existence of some
extrinsic fact, peculiarly within the agent's knowledge, then, if the power be
exercised, the principal is estopped to deny the truth of the fact represented by
the agent exercising that power!' Bank of Batavia v. R. R. Co., 1o6 N. Y. 195
(1887).
y (i893] 1 Q. B. 346. For a thorough discussion of this case, see Mechem,
The Liability of an Undisclosed Principal (19o9) 23 HARv. L. Rxv. 599.
81o N. H. 538 (1840).
Supra.note i, at 261 et seq.
MEcHEar,
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be gathered from a consideration of the form of the cheque itself,
from any relevant documentary evidence, and from the surrounding circumstances. The agent's motive in drawing the cheque is
immaterial, for the fact that he abuses his authority does not
destroy the authority. In such cases the apparent authority is the
real authority
.
regard to the facts of which the taker of
such instruments had notice is most material in considering
whether he took it in good faith . . . [but if] there was no
circumstance which ought to have put the defendants upon fur-.
ther inquiry, than that of asking to see the power of attorney
. .*[then] the mere fact in this case that the defendant did
not ask to see, and did not see the documents, cannot place them
in a worse position than if they had done so."
The rule for determining the principal's liability, as expressed in
tijis opinion, contains two expressions that must be examined further.
The first of these is "apparent authority," which with this court differs
fundamentally from the traditional understanding of that legal idea.
The concept as used by this court is in no way encumbered by the
necessity of a representation to the third person and the consequent
reliance thereon. It suffices if there is a holding out to the world in
general, to hold the principal liable to a third person dealing in good
faith with the agent. This is apparent authority that does not rest on
estoppel.
The second of these is the expression; common to all the analogous cases, that a wrongful motive on the part of the agent does not
take the act beyond his authority, that "motive is immaterial." This
can hardly mean that an improper motive does not destroy the real
authority as traditionally understood, for such reasoning would lead
to the conclusion that all that need be considered in determining what.
the principal actually authorizes is the mere mechanical behavior necessary to effect the act.10 But, where the agent performs those
mechanical movements which are the act, and in doing them betrays
the principal, he is not acting with his principal's consent and does not
have real authority, as is proved by the fact that if the third person has
knowledge of this so-called immaterial motive, the principal is not
bound." Rather the thought seems to be that since in general the
I It must be admitted that most of the American cases approach the problem
in that way. They consider merely whether the mechanical acts are authorized,
and it is immaterial whether the agent does exactly what he was told to do and
then pockets the proceeds, or whether the nature of the transaction with the
third person is such that the agent would not have entered into it, unless he had
improper motives in the first place. For example, see Empire Trust Co. v.
Cahan, 9 Fed. (2d) 7M3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), and see also the treatment of the
same case in the Supreme Court, 47 Sup. Ct. 66r (rg7).
'Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan, supra note 1o; Santa Marina Co. v. Canadian
Bank of Commerce, 254 Fed. 391 (C.C. A. 9th, 1918) ; Bank v. Iron Works, 4
Fed. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) ; Havana Cent. R. R. v. Knickerbocker Trust
.Co., ri9 N. Y. Supp. 1035 (i9o9), and the upper court report in I98 N. Y. 422,
92 N. B. 12 (xzo) ; Buena Vista Oil Co. v. Park Bank, 39 Cal. App. 7,0, 18o
Pac. 12 (1919).
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third person cannot know of the agent's motives, then if the motives
with which he acts appear to be proper, the third person is protected.
It seems preferable to describe this legal result as resting on apparent
authority without estoppel, instead of saying that the real authority is
not affected by an agent's improper motive, unless there is notice of it.
And that is no doubt the meaning of Sankey, L. J., when he says:
"In such cases the apparent authority is the real authority." Both of
these expressions have been voiced in several earlier cases, and an
examination of a few of them will explain the legal background
against which the principal case was decided.
In North River Bank v. Aymar,22 the agent, acting under a written power to indorse notes, indorsed a note, but for his own purposes,
and the principal was bound. The court applied the rule that "whenever by comparing the act done by the agent with the words of the
power, the act is in itself warranted by the terms used, such act is
binding on the constituent as to all persons dealing in good faith with
the agent." The court intimated that there was an estoppel under
these conditions. However while the power authorized this class of
act, it did not hold out that the agent could do this particular act, and
so it is difficult to find a true estoppel. Therefore it seems impossible
to find real or apparent authority as traditionally understood, to bind
the principal in this situation. This case either stands for the proposition that the agent's motive is immaterial, which has been criticised
above, or else it is an early and limited 120 application of the doctrine
of apparent authority without estoppel. Bank v. Ayntar differs from
the Reckitt case in that the third person saw the power of attorney.
Hambro v. Burnand,3 a well-known English case, may be taken
to represent the next step in the same problem. In that case the agent,
acting under a written authority, did the very type of act he was told to
do, that is, underwrote a policy of insurance, thereby guaranteeing the
contracts of a company which he was interested in, and which he knew
was insolvent. As in Bank v. Ayrnar, the court found that the third
person acted bona fide, but the difference is that here the third person
did not see the power of attorney. The rule given for holding the
principal was that whenever the very act done is covered by the
power, no inquiry is admissible into the agent's motives, provided the
third person acts bona fide, and for this a number of English and
American cases were cited. 4 The fact that the third person did not
13 Hill 262 (N. Y. x842).
It is a limited application, because it is only applied -where the third person has seen the power of attorney. In this stage of development, the pioblem
seems to be the same as is present in the "peculiar knowledge cases, supra note 6.
" [19R4] 2 M B. io. For a comment on this case as decided in the court
below, and which was reversed in the reporter cited, see (1903) 17 HARv. L.

Ray. 56.

"' Chief among which were: Bank of Bengal v. Fagan, 5 Moo. Ind. App.
27 (1849) ; Bryant v. Quebec Bank, 11893] A. C. 17o; North River Bank v.
Aymar, supra note 12; President of the Westfield Bank v. Cornea, 37 N. Y.

320 (1867).
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see the power did not influence the court. Romer, L. J., said:15 "the
plaintiffs are really in the same position as if they had asked to see
the written authority and had been allowed to do so." "6 This, of
course, is quite consistent with the explanation advanced in connection
with the Aymar case, that while the motive is an essential element that
cannot be separated from the act, yet if it would appear that the agent
is acting properly, the third person is protected. It is again a case of
apparent authority that does not rest on estoppel.
The Reckitt case follows immediately from Hambro v. Burnand.
In the latter case also the agent's motive was adverse to the principal's
interest. But the court did not confine itself to the narrow statement
that the agent's motive is immaterial, although that is mentioned. It
expressed the broader doctrine, that the objective appearance of the
authority, even though it was not manifest to the third person, and so
was not relied on by him, is determinative of the principal's liability.
Of course, as has been repeatedly intimated, this doctrine can be
invoked only where the third person acts bona fide, or, as it is often
expressed, where the third person has no noticeY The term notice,
without qualification, is ambiguous. Notice as used by the court in
the Reckitt case is used to mean knowledge that the agent actually has
exceeded his authority, and knowledge of the agent's fraudulent motive would fall within this class. Such notice destroys the third person's good faith, and prevents him from invoking to his aid the doctrine of apparent authority without estoppel. Notice is also used to
mean knowledge merely of the agency, or of such facts as should put
the third person on inquiry to ask to see the power, without necessarily informing him of the agent's fraud. Such notice and failure
to inquire may be evidence of bad faith, but when there is no bad
faith, this type of notice does not preclude the third person'from being
in the same position as if he had actually examined the documents,
that is, such notice does not prevent the application of the doctrine of
apparent authority without estoppel.
This case and the numerous other cases holding the principal
liable where the agent had neither real nor apparent authority as traditionally defined seems to indicate the inadequacy of these concepts to
explain the modem problems of agency law. The principal's liability
cannot be confined to acts to which he consents to be bound. To do so,
throws too great a burden on the third person dealing with the agent.
It would seem that when an agent is sent out in the world to do business, the third person should have much the same protection in dealing
with him that he-has in dealing with another person's negotiable in"Supra note 13, at 24.
"Apparently only one American case has explicity announced this doctrine,
Wilson v. Metropolitan Ry., i2o N. Y. 145 (189o). Cf., however, Daylight
Burner Co. v. Odlin, 5I N. H. 56 (i87x), and Wright, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 921.

'Cases supra note ii. See also John v. Dodwell [918] A. C. 563; Cor"poration Agencies v. Home Bank [1927] A. C. 318. See also note (1926) 75 U.
op PA. L. R-V. 64.
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strument. Certainly the analogy is very forceful where the agent has
a formal authorization. The doctrine of apparent authority without
estoppel as limited by the doctrine of notice seems well calculated to
achieve this effect.
Whether the rule of the principal case is to be limited to situations
where the agent has a written authority, as was expressly intimated in
Hambro v. Burnand, or is to be extended to oral authorizations, is
conjectural. A little-noticed decision from Illinois 1s seems to have
applied this rule in the case of an oral authorization, and such an
extension seems inevitable. The result of this development would be
that the "holding out to the world" would be determinative of the
scope of the agent's power to bind his principal. A provision to this
effect exists in the German Civil Code,1 9 but 2 in the common law is
expressly denied by most of the commentators.
R. deS. S.
SUGGESTED RULES OF COURT TO CURB UNDESIRABLE PRACTICES
oF LAwYERS IN THE MATTER OF PERSONAL INJURY CAsEs-The Law
Association of Philadelphia' is taking active steps to curb certain undesirable practices of some of the members of the bar of that county.2
The recent report 3 of the investigation of the committee of censors of
the association shows that the methods of attorneys for plaintiffs in
personal injury cases are clearly open to criticism. The attention of
the committee is particularly directed to the solicitation of personal
injury cases, to the handling of cases on a contingent fee basis, and to
the practices relative to testimony by medical practitioners. The
methods recommended by the committee and adopted by the Law
Association for correcting these practices take the form of proposed
rules of court rather than statutory provisions. The reason for this
lies in the fact that the court will give the proposed methods a warmer
'Thurber

v. Anderson, 88 Ill. 167 (1878).

The court speaking through

Schofield, C. J., said: "By permitting another to hold himself out to the

world as his agent, the principal adopts his acts, and -will be bound to the person who gives credit thereafter to the other, in the capacity of his agent." While
the case might possibly be rested on the ground of implied authority, it seems
clear that the court decided it on the ground of apparent authority. Ibid. at r68.
"Sec. 171.
' Seavey, op. cit. supra note 5, at 876. MECHSI, op. cit. supra note 5, at
743-4. E-wvart, Agency by Estoppel (19o2) i6 HARv. L. Rpm. 186, 191.
'A voluntary elective organization of members of the Philadelphia Bar.
2
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently taken steps to facilitate the maintenance of a high standard of practice among the members of its
bar. A rule of court has been adopted providing for the appointment of a Board
of Governance with power to examine complaints against the practices of attorneys and to recommend where necessary that disciplinary measures be taken.
The rule is published in (1928) 3 T miPx L. Q. So.
'Report of the Committee of Censors to the Law Association of Philadelphia: "In. re Contingent Fee Accident Litigation' Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
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reception and can act on them sooner. The report states as other reasons that the court having a wide discretion can administer rules in
accordance with their spirit, and that the rules themselves, dealing with
the relation of attorneys to the court, are not open to claims of unconstitutionality. The Law Association proposes to the Board of Judges
of the Courts of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that rules,
substantially as stated in the following paragraphs, be adopted.The purpose of the investigation of the committee of censors is to
obtain information as to the practice of procuring and conducting accident litigation and to report abuses connected with it, the causes of
such abuses and the methods recommended for correcting them. A
great part of the value of the report lies in the disclosure of facts
gathered from a detailed study of a large number of cases. These
facts are obtained from every attorney who had been retained by
plaintiffs in a considerable number of personal injury cases, and from
interviews with the plaintiffs in certain cases. 5
This investigation shows the employment of two methods of
direct solicitation of personal injury cases. The first is by means of
"runners" employed by the firm to procure powers of attorney from
claimants. The second is by "independent adjusters" who obtain
powers of attorney from claimants and peddle them among lawyers.
These lawyers consider themselves employed by the "adjuster" and
not by the client. Accident cases are also shown to be procured by
indirect solicitation. To accomplish this, the firm deliberately lets it
be known that anyone who brings successful accident cases to the firm
will be compensated. The compensation to the "runners" and "independent adjusters" is fixed by a graduated schedule for the different
grades of injuries. Both these types of solicitation are contrary to
the ethics of the profession and lead to abuses such as "trumped-up"
claims by those anxious for the compensation, and an increased cost
of suits, estimated by the committee at 15 per cent. of the total recoveries. The first proposed rule of court provides that no attorney shall
directly or indirectly give compensation for services resulting in his.
employment in any claim for the recovery of damages for injury to
person or property. The second proposed rule of court is aimed
directly at the "independent adjusters" and provides that no attorney
shall handle any claim for personal injuries except for the real claimant or another member of the bar, or divide his fee with any person
not a member of the bar or not in his exclusive employ. The recommendation to the court states that it is the sense of the Law Association that these two rules be extended to apply to other classes of litigation.
I At the date of printing, no action had beea taken by the Philadelphia
courts.
5
The court lent its aid to the committee of censors by granting the power
of subpoena to require the presence of witnesses at the formal hearings of the
eommittee. Act of igig, P. L. 384, §§ 1-3, PA.. STA. (West, Igao) §§ 868-870.
See (1928) 77 U. oF PA. L. Rs. 132.
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The committee finds that all attorneys specializing in accident
cases handle a majority of them on a contingent fee basis, under an
arrangement by which they agree to pay the legal expenses in the
event of no recovery. When there is a recovery either by settlement
or by suit, the attorney receives a percentage of either the gross or the
net amount. The committee is of the opinion that a contingent fee
arrangement is necessary for the protection of the general run of
injured persons who are in no condition to agree to pay expenses. To
prevent the collection of an exorbitant amount by the attorney, the
committee recommends the adoption of a rule of court that no attorney
shall make a contingent fee arrangement unless: (i) either the
basis for the fee be a proportion of the net recovery, or the client be
assured a specified proportion of the gross recovery; (2) the agreement provides that in case of the client's dissatisfaction with the
amount of the fee, he may have the court pass on the reasonableness
of it.
The most prevalent abuse in connection with the preparation and
trial of cases is the deliberate conversion, by means of improper medical testimony, of minor injuries into those of a serious nature. This
is believed to result largely from the employment of physicians on a
contingent or quasi-contingent basis. The remedy suggested is to
remove the inceitive offered to physicians by a rule of court that no
attorney shall directly or indirectly allow a medical practitioner compensation contingent on the outcome of a case involving damages for
personal injuries, or shall after the successful termination of the case
pay any compensation in addition to the compensation agreed on in
advance."
To correct abuses in connection with settlements with clients, the
association recommends a rule of court that every attorney receiving
money whether by settlement or suit shall fill out in duplicate a statement showing the disposition of the amount, one copy to be given to
the client and the other to be filed by the attorney for three years subject to inspection by the client, the court, and the committee of censors.
This report of the committee of censors and its adoption by the
Law Association is a valuable contribution toward the relief of a situation that tends to bring the legal profession into an unfavorable light.
It is to be hoped that the Philadelphia courts will adopt the proposed
rules of court, for it would seem that such rules will be effective in
their endeavor to compel the delinquent members of the bar to maintain the high'standard of practice that has characterized the Philadelphia bar.
S.B. C.
"A proposed rule of cpurt recommended by the committee of censors, but
not adopted by the Law Association, provided that expert medical testimony
be restricted to medical practitioners approved by the court from a list nominated
by the Council of the College of Physicians.

